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Abstract Recent academic debates about port com-
petition have centered on the strategic responses of
port authorities, operators, managers and owners to
the emergence of global supply chains. The compet-
itive performance of a port authority or operator,
given the rise of the integrated logistics sector,
depends increasingly on its strategic relationship to
these supply chains and rather less on traditional port
competition factors such as hinterland size and
physical infrastructure. However, there are few
empirical studies investigating the degree to which
particular port actors are capable of inserting them-
selves into global supply chains. In this article we ask
what factors condition the supply chain strategies of
port actors. We hypothesize that the strategic supply
chain choices of a port authority or operator are
conditioned by the territorialized institutional frame-
work in which the dominant actors in a port operate.
We apply these insights through a case study of the
transformation of Dubai Port Authority, and the rise
of Dubai Ports World (DPW).
Keywords Supply chains  Strategy  Dubai  Ports 
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Introduction
The rise of global production networks (GPN) has
been accompanied by the emergence of a new class
of actor on the global economic stage, the global
transportation and logistics operating firm (Dicken
2003). By virtue of their power to organize, co-
ordinate and even shape distribution systems that link
sites of global production and consumption, these
airlines, shipping lines, logistics providers and other
actors are attracting considerable interest among
economic and transportation geographers (Hall
et al. 2006; Hesse and Rodrigue 2006). One place
where the power, influence and limitations of the new
class of global actors are clearly on display is in the
world’s seaports where we observe a shift of respon-
sibilities from public port authorities to privately
owned global terminal operators (Olivier and Slack
2006; Slack and Fre´mont 2005). However, some of
the largest global terminal operators, most notably
Dubai Ports World (DPW) and the Port of Singapore
Authority (now PSA Corporation) began life as
public port authorities. Unlike carriers such as
Maersk which have their own terminal operating
subsidiaries, these actors have pursued an aggressive
strategy of horizontal integration, merging, acquiring
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and leasing port terminals well beyond their home
base.
How are we to understand the rise of these
formerly place-bound public authorities, and the
factors that lie behind their successful global reach?
Recent academic debate on port strategy has centered
on the emergence of global supply chains (Robinson
2002) and associated changes in the organization and
governance of the maritime logistical sector (Slack
2004; Notteboom 2004; World Bank 2001). Shipping
lines, private terminal operators and land-based
hinterland transporters have horizontally and verti-
cally integrated their operations and services through
strategic alignments, corporate takeovers and appli-
cation of new technologies. In some cases, the
bargaining power of these newly integrated players,
in terms of tariffs, terminal lease concessions and
service provision, has enhanced considerably vis-a`-
vis the public port authorities that control develop-
ment rights within the port area but that are them-
selves constrained by their physical immobility and
political accountability to the public. We have also
witnessed a process of market maturation with the
entry of new private container ports and port
operators.
What are the consequences for the competitive
strategies of port authorities and operators? As argued
by Robinson (2002), a port in the contemporary
world has to be understood as a location where third
party logistical service providers generate, share and
compete over value with other players within the
supply chain. Consequently, the port authority or
operator’s competitive strategic advantage is not only
based upon operational efficiency or location, but
increasingly on the degree to which it is embedded in
supply chains, is able to enhance the efficiencies
within these supply chains, and is able to extract
value from them. However, to date there has been
very little empirical research on what lies behind the
capability of some port operators to become success-
ful global supply chain actors.
We argue that ports are territorially embedded in a
historically path dependent and contingent institu-
tional framework. This framework constitutes the
context for strategic action (cf Storper 1997) by a
variety of port actors, including shippers, carriers,
port operators and public authorities. In turn, as these
actors provide critical logistical services, ports
become sites at which global supply chains may
become territorially embedded. Our hypothesis is that
the nature of the territorial relations of the port
conditions the supply chain strategy of key or
dominant port actors, and consequently the port’s
ability to become embedded in global supply chains.
In making this argument, we follow the relational
perspective of Henderson et al. (2002) who recognize
that Global Production Networks (GPN) are not
merely located in particular places. Instead, GPNs
become territorially embedded in the sense that they
are enabled and/or constrained by the prevailing
economic activities and social dynamics that already
exits in those places: ‘‘From a development point of
view, then, the mode of territorial embeddedness or
the degree of a GPN firm’s commitment to a
particular location is an important factor for value
creation, enhancement and capture’’ (Henderson et al.
2002, p.459). Thus, this argument turns on a two-way
interaction: at the same time that key port actors as
territorialized service providers need to embed
themselves into supply chains in order to safeguard
and strengthen their competitive positions, ‘foot-
loose’ firms operating in supply chains need to be
sensitive about the implications for value creation of
the territorialized institutional structure of ports
within which they become embedded. This paper
makes a first attempt to explore this relationship by
focusing on Dubai Ports and the transformation of its
public port authority into a transnational terminal
operator.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next
section we focus on the general debate about the
embeddedness of ports within supply chains and what
this implies for port strategies. In the third section we
construct a model to investigate these port strategies
within the territorially and institutionally embedded
structures in which ports operate by making use of
the structure of provision approach (SOP) (Jacobs
2007b). The conceptual model is then applied to the
case of Dubai.
In the period between February and May 2005, the
lead author conducted over 15 in depth interviews
with port and government officials in Dubai and Khor
Fakkan as well as with port users. Respondents were
identified through desk top research using a snowball
sampling technique, and additional interviews were
conducted until the researcher was confident that he
was not learning new or contradictory information. In
addition to the primary interviews, data was gathered
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from reviewing strategy and planning documents, as
well as the port’s quarterly magazine. Our analysis
sought to reconstruct the story of Dubai’s global
engagement by triangulation across the various data
sources.
Ports and supply chain strategies
What do port actors, including public port authorities
and terminal operators, want to achieve with respect
to supply chains? Hall and Robbins (2007) make a
distinction between insertion, integration and domi-
nance as strategic goals of port authorities and
operators, carriers, and other supply chain services
providers. These goals may be viewed as the logistics
sector analogues of the wider regional development
goals of value creation, enhancement and capture
discussed by Coe et al. (2004).1 However we do not
use their terms because we are reluctant to assume
that logistics sector actors are necessarily always
engaged in the wider regional development process as
commonly understood by economic geographers. For
instance, while efficient logistics services (i.e. inte-
gration) may be a vital part of the strategic coupling
process described by Coe et al., this process can also
facilitate flows that bypass or even displace local
economic actors. In other words, we choose to limit
the meaning that we attach to the supply chain
strategies of port authorities and operators because
we recognize that their actions are not necessarily
beneficial for regional economic development. In
what follows, we discuss each of the goals in turn,
noting that these goals are often closely inter-related
and mutually reinforcing. Thus, a port actor may
pursue more than one of these goals at a time.
First, port actors seek to insert themselves in
supply chains as it provides them with access to
critical resources such as technology, markets, cap-
ital, knowledge and expertise. In one sense, being
inserted into one or more supply chain is the
necessary precondition for a port (or any transporta-
tion hub) to become a site of economic activity;
however, insertion has become a more complex and
unstable goal for ports that find themselves in
competition with each other to serve the same GPNs
and hinterland territories. Over the years, port
authorities and operators have pursued the goal of
insertion by improving their landside connections; by
offering financial incentives (e.g. customized reduc-
tions on tariffs) and lease concessions (e.g. dedicated
terminals) to attract more shipping lines and port
calls; and by networking with other ports and setting
up regional trade offices (Notteboom and Winkel-
mans 2001).
Second, actors that are inserted in supply chains
may seek to integrate activities within the supply
chains in order to reduce overall transaction costs and
provide services more efficiently. One reason why
shipping lines have recently been engaged in vertical
and horizontal integration strategies which effectively
extend their control within the logistic chain, is so
that they can reduce uncertainty, transactions and
transport costs (Notteboom and Winkelmans 2001;
Slack et al. 2002). One role for port authorities is to
contribute to cost reduction for actors operating in
logistical chains. They can do so in a number of
ways. They can set up digital information systems
that provide cheap, reliable and easily accessible
operational information to port users. Port authorities
can offer inter-modal transfer possibilities. Through
effective land use planning they can stimulate the
development of clusters, which in turn fosters learn-
ing, innovating and harmonizing processes among
port users (de Langen 2003).
Third, actors operating in supply chains seek
dominance, that is, the ability or power to extract
value from logistics activities on a sustained basis. To
some degree all actors within a supply chain are in
competition with each other over the extraction and
capture of value created by logistical operations (Cox
et al. 2002). One strategy for dominance is to secure
control over a scarce competency or asset such as the
ability to handle niche cargo; exploiting economies of
scale is another strategy for many transportation
1 In turn, Coe et al (2004) are drawing on Kaplinsky’s (1998)
notion of value as economic rent, which Kaplinsky (2005) has
defined elsewhere as follows: ‘‘Rent describes a situation
where the parties who control a particular set of resources are
able to gain from scarcity by insulating themselves from
competition. This is achieved by taking advantage of or by
creating barriers to entry of competitors’’ (62). Constructing
barriers to entry is central to the supply chain strategies of
insertion, integration and domination. Routing a flow through
one port as opposed to another to generate back-haul savings
(insertion), achieving virtual integration through data sharing
(integration), or securing exclusive use of a marine terminal
(domination) are all examples of actions that establish barriers
to entry in the logistics sector.
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actors in the container/intermodal age. However,
these resource-based dominance strategies are neces-
sary but not sufficient for the sustained extraction of
value. Here we employ a relational notion of power,
in which power is defined as ‘‘the capacity to exercise
that is realized only through the process of exercis-
ing’’ (Dicken et al. 2001, p. 93). This implies that
dominance or power in a supply chain is both a
position relative to others and to key resources, as
well as a set of practices with regards to those
relationships and resources. To illustrate this point,
we might say that Maersk’s dominance amongst
container lines is not only about having the biggest
ships; it is also about deploying these ships strategi-
cally to secure dredging and other concessions.
Using very different language, Heaver et al. (2000,
p. 364) have observed precisely this behaviour in the
shipping industry: ‘‘[T]here appears to be a strong
economic incentive to acquire direct control over an
ever larger part of the logistical chain’’. Vertical and
horizontal integration by shipping lines and terminal
operators have de facto increased their control over
the logistical chain and, as such, their bargaining
power vis-a`-vis the port authorities and other place
bound actors. This makes established ports reconsider
their services, overall capacity, property rights
arrangements, pricing policies and hinterland con-
nections. In the case of Dubai, this reconsideration
has led to the extension an aggressive dominance
strategy from the regional to the global scale.
A complicating factor in global supply chain
strategies of port actors is spatial scale (Hall and
Robbins 2007). We can not reduce the spatial
dimension in a simple global-local dichotomy since
port actors are subject to a path dependent and place
specific institutional framework (Stevens 1997; Hall
2003; Slack and Fre´mont 2005) that is both con-
straining and enabling. This implies that we need to
be sensitive to the spatial organization of the state,
the competencies of its agencies as well as the set of
formal rules which structure the interaction between
public and private agents.
The embeddedness of ports and supply chains
In order to develop a theoretical understanding of
the factors that condition the supply chain strategies
of ports, we first need to conceptualize supply
chains themselves. Drawing on recent economic
geography literature, we make use of the Global
production network-perspective (cf. Henderson
et al. 2002; Coe et al. 2004). Global production
networks (GPN) can be defined as the globally
organized nexus of interconnected functions and
operations through which goods and services are
produced, distributed and consumed. They are
constructed and transformed over time by public,
private or collective agents with asymmetrical
positions of influence and power at different spatial
scales. Firms operating in GPNs are characterized
by their links with other members of the GPN
regardless of their country of origin or local
anchoring. The durability and stability of these
formal and informal relationships determines the
actor’s individual network embeddedness as well as
the structure and evolution of GPN as a whole.
Network embeddedness involves inter-firm relation-
ships as well as the relationships between firms and
governmental agents at different spatial scales.
GPNs do not simply locate themselves in a
particular place. Rather, they have histories of
origin that condition their global expansion, and
once a firm physically locates itself in another
place, it is enabled and constrained by the
economic activities and socio-cultural dynamics
that already exist in that place. In other words,
firms and GPNs are constantly becoming territori-
ally embedded. Territorial embeddedness considers
the extent to which an actor is anchored in
particular territories or places. This embeddedness
will manifest itself physically, institutionally and
politically.
Actors become physically embedded through their
investments in the built environment (e.g. lease
concession, investments in superstructure) and also
through their engagement with local resources and
actors, including labour. Institutionally, actors be-
come embedded through a set of formal rules and
social relations that exist at a certain place and which
enable and constrain them in their actions. Politically,
the territorial embeddedness of actors manifests itself
in the governance structure in which decisions over
the allocation of resources and distribution of wealth
are contested and negotiated. In order to investigate
the territorial embeddedness of key or dominant
actors in ports and their supply chain strategies, we
make use of the structure of provision approach
(SOP) as applied to ports (cf. Jacobs 2007b).
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Structure of port provision
The SOP was initially developed to investigate the
political economy of the British housing market (Ball
1983), but can be applied to virtually any form of the
built environment (Ball 1998; Gore and Nicholson
1991). A structure of provision refers to a network of
social relationships, institutions and organizations,
associated with the provision of particular types of
building at specific points in time and space. ‘Pro-
vision’ encompasses the development, construction,
ownership and use of land and buildings.
When we apply the SOP to ports, the focus is thus
concerned with the interaction between organizations
and institutions involved in the provision of a specific
port’s land, infrastructure and superstructure (e.g.
cranes, storage facilities, gates, fork-trucks). For
analytical reasons we distinguish three categories in
the structure of provision which in reality are closely
inter-related.2 The first category refers to the actual
physical condition of the ports, i.e. the quality of the
port’s infrastructure, superstructure and development
potential on the port’s land. The second category
relates to institutional arrangements which regulate
the use, ownership and development of port land and
the infra/superstructure. Here we include property
rights, land use planning, port tariffs, environmental
and safety/security stipulations. The third category
concerns the way port governance is structured,
referring to the division of responsibilities between
the public and private sector and between the
different administrative-territorial levels of the state.
Port governance structures play a key role in the way
these institutions and organizations interact in the
provision of the physical attributes of the port (Jacobs
2007b).
A structure of provision is not static, but is the
subject of continual path dependent change due to
market pressures, technological innovations, policies
and other strategies of the organizations involved (cf.
Ball 1998). It is here where we bring in the supply
chain strategies of insertion, integration and domi-
nance into our model (see Fig. 1). Actors use these
strategies as they seek to become embedded within
global supply chains and production networks. Global
supply chains are characterized by particular constel-
lations of inter-firm and public–private relationships
(e.g. contractual agreements, corporate ties, align-
ments, cartels) that define the market landscape in
which actors compete and in which they hold
asymmetrical power positions. However, actors oper-
ating in supply chains at the same time become
territorially embedded in a particular port’s SOP, for
example, by acquiring a dedicated terminal conces-
sion. Once territorially embedded, these players
become more or less dependent on the port’s
development and policies for their own competitive
position within the supply chain.
What dimensions of the SOP provide more
freedom of action for port actors to successfully
engage in supply chain strategies and to become
firmly embedded within these GPNs? In one case the
SOP might enable actors to pursue aggressive supply
chain strategies that might facilitate their ‘global’
expansion, whereas in another case the SOP may
constrain such actions. Here it is important that we do
not view the various categories of the SOP in
isolation since they are closely inter-related. Obvi-
ously the physical attributes of the port are an
important factor influencing insertion into a given







































Fig. 1 The embeddedness of ports and global supply chains
2 A SOP is sector specific; even within ports we can distinguish
different SOPs, depending on the economic activity under
study. Clearly, the dynamics of the container sector differ with
the dynamics in the bulk-sector or the automotive-sector,
which corresponds with different types of firms and interests,
with different demands for the built environment and for the
ports’ institutional arrangements. In this article we focus on the
container sector.
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supply chain. Without the appropriate infra-and
superstructure and sufficient capacity, or a suitable
location, no port will be able to attract cargo flows on
a sustainable basis. However, network embeddedness
is not only achieved by providing the right physical
conditions, but also needs to be supported by
institutional arrangements and governance structures
which, in turn, allows for further integration of the
port in the supply chain. In this respect, the owner-
ship and user rights of the port’s physical attributes
are of strategic importance, as are any regulatory
constraints on whether operators can engage in
‘strategic pricing’ or provide financial incentives to
customers.
Here, the degree of competition within the port
and between ports in the region is particularly
relevant. Wherever intra-port competition is limited,
a port operator can, in theory, extract monopoly-rents
(de Langen and Pallis 2006) and acquire super-
profits. The ability to do so depends on the degree to
which an operator has full ownership over the port’s
physical resources and the degree to which it is
constrained by regulatory bodies, such as the port
authority or other state agencies. Limited intra-port
competition is also likely to imply a more consoli-
dated governance structure and lower costs associated
with coordination and conflict-resolving mechanisms
among port users. Increased competition between
ports within the region can prevent intra-port monop-
olists from acquiring super-profits, even if high
barriers to entry to the monopolist’s port remain (cf.
Notteboom 2002). However, increased inter-port
competition and limited intra-port competition might
also lead an intra-port monopolist to seek to extract
rents from the public sector and immobile port users
through strategic pricing, especially when it has
preferential access to capital or when it does not face
any institutional constraints or political opposition
through the governance system.
In that respect, we need to take into account the
role of the public sector and its commitment and
support to the port’s development and management.
In physical terms, the state can subsidize port
development directly by, for example, financing port
expansion projects or the improvement of hinterland
connections, or indirectly by, for example, offering
favorable conditions under which a port can borrow
money from the state for strategic investments. As the
rule-making and enforcing agent, the state can offer
favorable institutional conditions for port operators to
compete and engage in supply chain strategies in a
number of ways by, for example, setting high
regulatory barriers to market entry for foreign
companies within the port, through shareholding in
port authorities or through direct ownership of the
physical attributes of the port. These latter aspects are
directly related to the governance dimension of the
SOP. The way the state provides material or institu-
tional support to ports depends on the history of the
ports, their contribution to the economy (in terms of
jobs and revenues), and the structure of the state itself
(Brooks and Cullinane 2006; Jacobs 2007a).
As such, the SOP acts to create strategic oppor-
tunities by which global operating firms may become
territorially embedded within a port and, in so doing,
can capture the value created in particular geographic
location. At the same time the SOP also acts to create
strategic opportunities for locally based and port
dependent actors to attach to, and become embedded
within, particular GPNs. The relationship between
GPNs and SOPs is thus that they are mutually
constituting and co-evolving. How this strategic
game plays out in particular places remains an
empirical question, and in turning to specific cases,
we should be aware of contingent factors such as
regional context and history, the scalar structure of
the state, timing and perhaps even pure luck. The
remainder of this paper examines these relationships
in more detail in Dubai.
The case of Dubai ports
Dubai is a fast growing city-state of 1.2 million
inhabitants, located at the Arabian Gulf.3 It is one of
the seven United Arab Emirates,4 a federation
founded in 1971 when the British abandoned this
imperial outpost. Though the discovery of oil in 1968
definitely contributed to Dubai’s initial economic and
urban growth, the contribution of oil to local GDP in
2006 was less than 10% and still declining. Over the
last 20 years Dubai has strategically re-invested oil
3 In the western world, the Arabian Gulf is often named the
Persian Gulf. We use both names interchangeably.
4 The Federation of the United Arab Emirates consists of the
capital Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al Khaimah, Ajman,
Umm al Quwain and Fujairah.
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revenue in the diversification of its economy and by
doing so, reduced its dependency on the oil-sector
(Jacobs 2005). Its twin seaports (Jebel Ali and Port
Rashid) and airport have been the cornerstones of this
development strategy (Broeze 1999).
Today, Dubai is the Middle East’s main transpor-
tation hub5 (see Table 1), a position which it
consolidated in recent years. This is despite the fact
that new regional competitors emerged in the 1990s,
most notably Salalah, Khor Fakkan, and Aden. These
ports at the Arabian Sea enjoy a geographical
advantage over Dubai. For instance, transit through
the Straits of Hormuz means that it takes a vessel 24 h
longer to reach Dubai than Khor Fakkan (see Fig. 2).
Major port improvements in India and Pakistan also
started to pose threats to Dubai’s position as major
transhipment hub for the Subcontinent. More signif-
icantly, these new facilities were partly developed
and operated by established private players in termi-
nal operations: APM-Maersk in Salalah, PSA in
Aden, and P&O Ports in Nheva Sheva (Mumbai) and
Port Qasim (Karachi). In order to understand how
Dubai has developed into the region’s main hub and
how it countered these competitive threats, we need
to take into account the territorial embeddedness of
Dubai Ports as conceptualized in Fig. 1. We begin
this section by discussing the physical, institutional
and governance dimensions of Dubai’s structure of
provision, before showing how this framework has
provided the context for Dubai’s successful supply
chain strategies since 1990.
The nature of territorial embeddedness
of Dubai ports
Physical conditions
As regards the physical conditions, both Dubai Ports
are able to compete successfully against regional
competitors which enjoy more favourable geographic
locations by offering superior facilities: ‘‘DPA’s
[Dubai Ports Authority] success has been built on
solid foundations, which include a state-of-the-art
infrastructure and superstructure, a slick marketing
machine and a professional service’’ (Drewry 2000,
p. 100). The container terminals at Jebel Ali and Port
Rashid are 1,150,800 and 689,400 square meters
respectively. Control of all the port land ultimately
lies in the hands of the Emir or ruler of Dubai who
has gifted the freehold to DPA. At the time of
writing, port land is not available for lease to third
parties. The depth of the main channel of Jebel Ali is
17 m and the width is 320 m. Port Rashid’s main
channel has a width of 190 m and a minimum depth
of 13 m. DPA also owns the superstructure at both
ports. Port Rashid has seven Panamax cranes. At
Jebel Ali DPA deploys 23 cranes of which 11 are
super post Panamax cranes, allowing DPA to handle
the biggest carriers in the business. Within the ports
of Dubai, DPA has a monopoly with no intra-port
competition from other terminal operators. This
exclusive position in terms of container terminal
operations within Jebel Ali port has however been not
unproblematic given the increased demand by ship-
ping lines for dedicated terminals: ‘‘[d]uring 1999 the
DPA confirmed that 25–30% of its Maersk-Sealand
transhipment business has been lost to Salalah.’’(Dre-
wry 2000, p. 18). These developments pose questions
as to what degree DPA will be able maintain its
monopoly at Jebel Ali.
An integral part of Jebel Ali port is the Jebel Ali
Free Zone (see Fig. 3). In 1991 over 300 companies
(DPA 1992) were located in the Free Zone.6 The
Zone currently hosts 3,880 businesses originating
from over 100 countries of which 39% come from the
Middle East region, 29% from Asia, 20% from
Europe and 7% from the Americas. The planned
development of nearby Jebel Ali International Air-
port, will provide opportunities for sea-air modal
shifts and further strengthen the port-industrial clus-
ter.
5 The Middle East is serviced with direct port calls at the Gulf
and the Red Sea, where the ports of Dubai and Jeddah act as
hub for intra-regional feeder services. Because of the lack of
competitive infrastructure, the Indian Subcontinent also acts as
the extended hinterland of the Gulf ports for the ocean-carriers.
Historically, Colombo has also played a strong role as
transhipment hub for this market (cf. Drewry 2000).
6 There are in fact several Free Zones in Dubai that act as
clusters since they are entirely dedicated to specific types of
business activity, for example Dubai Media City, Dubai
Knowledge Village, Dubai Internet City. Also the major
housing projects (the Palms, the World) are designated as Free
Zones.
GeoJournal (2007) 68:327–342 333
123
Institutional arrangements
Dubai Ports can be best understood as a public
service port (Stevens 1997; World Bank 2001), since
all the land, infra-and super-structure are in hands of
DPA. As the state agency in charge of Dubai Ports
and its terminal operations, DPA decides on the port
dues and the terminal tariffs. The port dues are levied
on all vessels entering the port, apart from those
exempted by the ruler of Dubai. For vessels moving
between Port Rashid and Jebel Ali, port dues are
assessed as if the vessel had made only one contin-
uous Dubai Port stay. DPA also applies a so-called
Port Receiving Charge (PRC) against loaded and
empty containers and bulk cargo trailers entering or
exiting port property from the landside via non-Dubai
Ports. The PRC is also levied on containers which
have stayed outside port custody for a period of more
than 20 days. This is to discourage the trucking of
containers to Dubai from other ports in the region.
Table 1 Regional ports throughput (TEU) and market share (%)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Gulf ports (country)a
Dubai ports (UAE)b 3,058,868 3,501,820 4,194,265 5,151,956 6,428,883 7,619,222
Market share (%) 27 28 29 29 30 33
Khor Fakkan (UAE) 1,014,122 1,089,866 1,266,131 1,449,451 1,819,431 1,929,729
Market share (%) 9 9 9 8 9 8
Other UAE-portsc 982,793 666,973 647,426 587,581 652,318 291,700d
Market share (%) 9 5 4 3 3 1
Dammam (KSA) 454,640 489,544 563,149 634,976 743,457 894,809
Market share (%) 4 4 4 4 3 4
Mina Sulman (Bahr.) 132,100 140,144 155,037 175,688 193,731 N.A.
Market share (%) 1 1 1 1 1
Bandar Abbas (Iran) 415,382 548,000 731,000 965,011 1,142,659 1,265,000
Market share (%) 4 4 5 5 5 5
Other regional ports (country)
Jeddah (KSA) 1,043,617 1,180,427 1,366,902 1,763,865 2,425,930 2,860,000
Market share (%) 9 9 9 10 11 12
Salalah (Oman) 1,032,692 1,187,753 1,211,634 2,001,259 2,228,546 2,491,741
Market share (%) 9 9 8 11 10 11
Port Qaboos (Oman) 128,857 143,933 203,864 264,826 286,810 N.A.
Market share (%) 1 1 1 1 1
Colombo (Sri Lanka) 1,732,855 1,726,605 1,764,717 1,959,336 2,220,573 2,455,329
Market share (%) 15 14 12 11 10 11
Nheva Sheva (India) 1,124,723 1,462,000 1,850,000 2,174,098 2,361,000 2,568,000
Market share (%) 10 12 13 12 11 11
Port Qasim (Pakistan) N.A. 172,000 289,000 419,000 519,000 585,000
Market share (%) 1 2 2 2 3
Aden (Yemen) 248,112 377,708 398,981 156,151 318,901 317,897
Market share (%) 2 3 3 1 1 1
a Does not include ports of Shuwaikh and Shuaibah (Kuwait), Umm Qasr (Iraq), Jubail (KSA), Bandar Khoumeini (Iran) due to lack
of data. The Kuwaiti Ports combined had a throughput of 333,097 TEU in 2001 equivalent to a market share of 2% or 3%
b Jebel Ali + Port Rashid
c Includes Port Zayed (Abu Dhabi), Port of Fujairah (Fujairah) and Port Khalid (Sharjah)
d Excludes the throughput of Port Khalid
Source: Provided by DPA (2005), verified by authors
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Through its tariff, DPA can provide strategic
financial incentives to attract shipping lines and their
containers. Empty and transhipment containers have
a free storage time of 20 days; import and export
containers have 10 days free storage time. Containers
subject to PRC are exempted from the limits on free
storage time. More importantly, DPA provides con-
siderable discounts on the terminal tariffs to shipping
lines that guarantee at least 18,000 full container
(over 20 feet) moves per year, with more generous
discounts available at higher thresholds up to 80,000
full container moves per year (see DPA Port Tariff,
section D 2006). When a shipping line can guarantee
more than 80,000 moves per year it receives a 48%
discount on the terminal tariffs for every move
beyond that level. These discounts allow shipping
lines to capture value by reducing operating costs or
lowering their prices.
The institutional arrangements at the Jebel Ali
Free Zone also confer competitive supply chain
advantages. Full foreign share ownership is allowed
inside the Free Zone, whereas only 49% foreign share
ownership is allowed outside the Free Zone. Land,
offices and pre-fabricated industrial units within the
Free Zone are available for various lease periods,
with no freehold (fee simple or absolute) ownership
allowed. The absence of freehold ownership appar-
ently does not have any effect on the attraction of
businesses. There are no corporate taxes, no personal
income taxes, and 100% repatriation of capital and
profits. There is no imposition of duties on imported
or exported goods within the Free Zone, whereas
outside the Free Zone custom duties are fixed at 5%
by the Gulf Cooperation Council.7 This latter
arrangement also largely works to the advantage of
Dubai since its ports act as the GCC’s main point of
entry for imports.
How can DPA finance these considerable dis-
counts? One might wonder whether there is not some
form of subsidy through the state’s oil revenues. DPA
senior managers insisted in interviews that there is no
state subsidy involved and that DPA is a financially
independent, if state-owned, commercial enterprise.
No evidence of direct state subsidy in the form of
money transfers from the government to DPA has
been found. Indirectly, however, the state does
Fig. 2 The major ports in the Greater Middle East. Source: Jacobs (2007a)
7 The Gulf Cooperation Council consists of Kuwait, Bahrain,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Oman. They
formed a customs union in 2003 with custom duties fixed at 5%
and with single entry point arrangement for imported goods
into the Union.
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provide subsidy, e.g. through tax breaks for foreign
firms locating in Dubai or by providing cheap energy
to firms. Clearly, the construction of Port Rashid and
Jebel Ali has been financed from oil-revenues, but
most ports across the world have been developed with
considerable financial support from their national
governments. DPA is part of a larger conglomerate,
the Port Customs & Free Zone Corporation (PCFC)
and, as we will see in the next section, PCFC includes
a number of other divisions through which capital can
be mobilized and transferred to DPA. It must be
stated, however, that PCFC’s actual financial position
is not known since they do not publish any annual
financial statements.
As regards labour costs and conditions, the salient
point is that labour unions are not tolerated in the
Emirate. As such, DPA can implement work and
technological changes with relative ease as they face
no union opposition. Stevedore labour is provided
by the Dubai Labour Supply Company (Dulsco), a
locally based limited liability company with strong
government ties. Much of the unskilled and cheap
labour is recruited in India and Pakistan and trained
in Dubai. However, for such specialized operations
(e.g. post Panamax crane drivers) no expenses are
spared to recruit the best in the industry. Tough
immigration laws and hiring-and-firing at will make
the labour force extremely vulnerable and power-
less. The costs of labour are approximately
125 Dhs./gang hour (equivalent to some 35 US$/
gang hour), although much depends on the size of
the gang.
As regards security, Dubai was the first port in the
region to join the Container Security Initiative (CSI)
in 2004, later to be followed by Salalah and
Colombo. Currently, Dubai is the only port in the
Gulf that is allowed to handle containers that are
directly bound for the United States. This is a
considerable competitive advantage over the other
ports in a region troubled by various armed conflicts
that ultimately result in higher insurance rates for
shipping goods. Dubai and its ports also came out of
the first Gulf War (1991–1992) relatively unharmed
and to some degree took advantage of it. As DPA’s
Handbook of 1992 announces: ‘‘[A]s a result of the
Gulf War, the Port Rashid Terminal became the
distribution hub for a number of motor vehicle
manufacturers’’ (DPA 1992, p. 33).
Fig. 3 Location of Dubai ports, Jebel Ali Free Zone and major urban projects. Source: Jacobs (2007a)
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According to sources within DPA, Dubai Ports
was able to retain their customer base after the start of
the Second Gulf War in 2003 in spite of the higher
insurance rates for ships entering the Gulf. This is
because DPA took upon full responsibility for all
vessels bound for Dubai. By taking on this financial
risky commitment, DPA ensured its growth even in a
time of armed conflict. The second Gulf War has in
fact brought in more transhipment cargo to Dubai,
since Port Rashid has been dedicated almost entirely
to the logistical supply of the Allied forces in Iraq and
the transhipment of materials for the reconstruction.
Governance structure
An overriding institutional feature of Dubai is the
strong corporatist leadership of the Emirate. The emir
and ruler of Dubai and vice-president of the UAE,
currently His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Ras-
hid Al Maktoum, wields considerable decision-mak-
ing power. He is surrounded by a small group of local
elites (the Director-Generals) who are in charge of
Dubai’s governmental departments and the state-
controlled enterprises. The Director-General of the
Ports Customs & Free Zone Corporation (PCFC),
Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, controls amongst other
things, DPA and Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority
(JAFZA) as well as the overall holding company
Dubai World. He also appoints the members of the
PCFC’s board of directors. The current board is a
mixture of local business leaders and former directors
of CSX World Terminals, a result of the takeover by
PCFC to be discussed later.
The dominance of the Al Maktoum Family is a
central feature of the governance of the Dubai state.
The Al Maktoum-clan ensures political support for its
hereditary leadership and growth agenda by mobiliz-
ing the members of other locally based families into
the state apparatus. As Davis (2006, p. 61) critically
observed: ‘‘Feudal absolutism—the Maktoum dy-
nasty owns the land area of Dubai—meanwhile has
been spruced up as the last word in enlightened
corporate administration, and the political sphere has
been officially collapsed into the managerial’’. Not-
withstanding this critique, governance arrangements
do ensure swift decision-making over port develop-
ment projects since there is virtually no political
opposition from environmental or community pres-
sure groups, or labour unions. The rulers of Dubai can
therefore implement its economic growth agenda
with relative ease. As such, the Emirate of Dubai can
be best understood as an autocratic development state
(Painter 2000), identified in places such as Singapore
and Taiwan. It is thus not surprising that Dubai chose
an aggressive and increasingly globally-oriented
supply chain strategy when it began to face compe-
tition from other ports in the region in the 1990s.
Dubai’s supply chain strategy
Insertion: Jebel Ali Port and Free Zone Cluster
The construction of Port Rashid located in Dubai City
started in the 1960s and was accomplished in 1972.
Not long after completion, the former emir Sheikh
Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum launched another port
development project at Jebel Ali. The first phase of
the project was finished in 1979 and the project was
completed in 1983. Together with the creation of the
Jebel Ali Free Zone in 1985, Dubai had put in place
the most modern infra- and superstructure in the
region capable of handling the (post-) Panamax
generation of ocean carriers. By successfully antic-
ipating containerization, Dubai was able to partici-
pate in the continuous growth of trade and
consumption in the region.
The Free Zone and the Port clearly have a
symbiotic relationship. The Free Zone has ensured
the Dubai port’s focus on transhipment, and the
proximity of the port has attracted numerous value-
added activities into the Free Zone. Almost two-
thirds of Dubai’s trade volume is re-exported, with
exporters and manufacturers benefiting from the
tax-incentives in the Free Zone. Among the supply
chains routed through the Free Zone are construc-
tion materials (e.g. steel, fibre optics, machine
tools), automotive parts and vehicles, electronics,
textiles, food and beverages. The typical value
added activity includes the assembling, labelling
and repackaging of goods that are produced in
factories in India, China and Southeast Asia and
destined for the European and North-American
consumer markets. In addition, the Free Zone hosts
the regional trade offices of such global consumer
product manufacturers as Sony, General Electric,
Philips, Honda, LG, Nokia, Pepsi Co to cost-
effectively distribute their brands and products to
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fast growing markets in the region. As such, the
Jebel Ali ‘Free Zone- port bundle’ allows Dubai to
‘‘tap into global outsourcing trends and to insert
themselves in the global production chain’’ (Wang
and Olivier 2006, p. 1487) or as pointed out by one
senior Arab industry commentator: ‘‘Clearly, the
success of Jebel Ali as a port is based less on
Dubai’s domestic growth than on its ability to
handle transhipment bound for India, Iraq, Iran and
the wider region’’ (Gulf Business, p. 46, February
2005).
Integration: formation of the Ports Customs
and Free Zone Corporation
The management of the two biggest ports was merged
in 1991 to form the Dubai Ports Authority (DPA).
Before the merger both ports were managed by
separate entities that relied on expertise from the
private sector. CSX and its daughter company Sea-
Land managed Jebel Ali Port, whereas Port Rashid
made use of Gray MacKenzie Company. To further
increase operational efficiency, DPA and JAFZA
were merged to form the Ports, Customs & Free Zone
Corporation (PCFC) in 2001. Besides DPA and
JAFZA, PCFC also includes the Dubai Customs
Department and Dubai Ports World (see Fig. 4). This
integration accommodates the supply chains’ prefer-
ence for a ‘one-stop-one-shop’ when interacting with
port operators and public authorities. An additional
advantage is that custom duties directly flow to the
PCFC instead of the state treasury.
The influence of Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem on
Dubai’s growth is considerable, given the fact that
he is also the chairman of Nakheel Properties, the
state-owned property developer responsible for
extraordinary developments such as ‘‘The Palms’’,
‘‘The World’’ and ‘‘Dubai Waterfront’’. Most of the
trucks and material needed for the construction of
these projects comes from abroad and as such
increases the cargo throughput of the ports. In 2006,
the PCFC became part of an even larger holding
company named Dubai World which also includes a
number of other operations, most notably, Dubai
Maritime City. This organization is involved in the
development of the Maritime City near Port Rashid
and is planned to be cluster for all kinds of
maritime-related services such as logistical advice,
legal advice and ship repair.
Dominance: the growth to transnational terminal
operator
By the end of the 1990s, DPA’s ambitions to become
a recognized global ports manager were clearly
apparent. The entry of established global operators
in the regional market posed considerable treats to
Dubai’s leading hub status. In response, DPA set up
an international division in 1998, named Dubai Ports
International (DPI, later to be renamed Dubai Ports
World), and rapidly started to expand abroad. In
1997, DPA won a 20-year concession to manage the
South Container Terminal at Jeddah Islamic Port in
Saudi Arabia in partnership with local company
Siyanco. One year later, DPI won a 20-year conces-
sion to manage a new container terminal at the Port of
Beirut in Lebanon, only to pull back after a few years
because of claimed miscalculated start-up costs and
traffic volumes (UNCTAD 2003, p. 80). Neverthe-
less, DPI together with its sister company Jebel Ali
Free Zone International continued to expand and
strengthen its international position. Together they
took over the management of the Port of Djibouti, its
international airport, and the concession to develop
and manage a free zone in the Horn of Africa. At the
end of December 2005, DPI also acquired the lease
concession of Aden’s former PSA terminal,8 effec-
tively eliminating the (potential) threat of Yemen’s
port city to Dubai’s regional hub status. As such
PCFC has been very active in securing terminals
within its competitive port range. This is a clear
dominance strategy to ensure that lines cannot bypass
their facilities.
The portfolio of PCFC also includes the manage-
ment of the ports of Visakhapatnam and Cochin in
India. Dubai Ports entered the European market in
2004 when it won the management contract for the
Port of Constanzia in Rumania. JAFZI manages the
free zone of Tangiers in Morocco and of Port Klang
in Malaysia. PCFC secured its first multi-port deal in
December 2004 when it outbid established global
terminal operators Hutchison Port Holdings and PSA
to acquire the Florida-based CSX World Terminals
for US $1.15 billion. An interesting irony in this
8 The probable reason for the withdrawal of PSA from Aden is
the disappointing level of productivity that can be largely
attributed to terrorist’s attacks in the port on the U.S.S. Cole
(2000) and a CMA-CGM’s oil-tanker in 2003.
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transaction is that CSX’s former daughter Sea-Land
used to have the management contract at Dubai’s
Jebel Ali Port. With the acquisition of CSXWT,
Dubai Ports took over the management of nine
container terminals worldwide (outside the US) with
a total handling capacity of 14.6 million TEUs,
including the CT3 and CT8 terminals in the world’s
second busiest containerport, Hong Kong (see
Table 2). The acquisition provided PCFC the oppor-
tunity to capitalize on the world’s fastest growing
markets in China and Southeast Asia. As such, Dubai
had developed from a local port authority to a global
terminal operator.
About a year after this major takeover PCFC’s
international division, now renamed as Dubai Ports
World, acquired one of the world’s major stevedore
companies, P&O Ports, in a deal worth US$ 6.8 bil-
lion. And once again, DPW managed to outbid its
major competitor PSA. Much of the capital was
raised through a sukuk or Islamic bond9 (worth in
total US$3.5 billion) issued by the Dubai Islamic
Bank and Barclays Capital. This takeover enabled
DPW to further strengthen its position in India and
East Asia while penetrating the Australian and
European stevedore markets (see Table 3). The
takeover of P&O Ports’ portfolio in the United States
(New York–New Jersey, Philadelphia, Baltimore,
Miami, New Orleans) was however blocked by the
American Congress in early March 2006, ostensibly
over national security concerns.
In combination with DPA’s home terminal in
Dubai, PCFC was capable of handling up to 40 mil-
lion TEUs in 2006, and has become the world’s third
largest port operator. Yet, the focus on foreign
markets and other regions does not imply that PCFC
will lose its roots in the Middle East. In January 2005
DPW signed a Memorandum of Understanding with
the Abu Dhabi Seaport Authority and the Port of
Fujairah to take over the management of their ports.
Plans have also been made to expand Jebel Ali Port
with three more container terminals through land
reclamation, increasing its handling capacity to over
20 million TEUs by the 2020s (PCFC 2004).
Conclusions
We started the paper by posing the question what
conditions the supply chain insertion, integration and
dominance strategies of ports? We hypothesized that
the nature of the territorial embeddedness of the port
conditions the supply chain strategies of key or
dominant port actors and consequently the port’s
embeddedness in global supply chains. For that
purpose we made use of the structure of provision-
approach, and identified the place specific and path
dependent physical, institutional, and political factors
that underlie the territorial embeddedness which
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Fig. 4 PCFC’s corporate
structure. Source: Jacobs
(2007a)
9 The Islamic bond market is based on Shariah, the legal code
of Islam, which forbids Muslims from receiving or paying
interest. In the case of sukuks, assets are sold to a special-
purpose company, which then rents them back to the user.
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Table 2 CSX world terminal’s portfolio acquired by DPW
CSX world terminal’s global port business
Country Terminal Shareholding (%) Timing
China Tianjin 24.5 Operational
Yantian 50.0 Operational
Qingdao 26.9 2007
Hong Kong CT3 56.7 Operational
Hong Kong CT8 68.6 2005
Korea PNC Pusan 25.0 2006
Germany Germersheim 100.0 Operational
Australia Adelaide 5.5 Operational
Venezuela Puerto Cabello 50.0 Operational
Dominican Republic Caucedo 35.0 Operational
Source: Gulf Business, February 2005
Table 3 P&O ports global container terminal portfolio acquired by DPW
Country Terminal Shareholding (%) Area size (ha) Throughput 2004 (TEU)
India Nhava Sheva 100 29 1,214,333
Mundra 100 34 177,896
Chennai 75 13.9 599,980
Pakistan Port Qasim 55 24 494,535
Sri Lanka Colombo 16.25 20 146,205
Russia Vostochny 25 38 68,084
China Qingdao 29 146 1,087,358
Shekou (to be developed) 22.5 Phase I 51 (combined) 474,679
22.5 Phase II
Philippines Manila 81.13 21.5 642,858
Thailand Laem Chabung 34.50 18.2 357,670
Indonesia Surabaya 49 73.8 528,487
Argentina Rio de Plata 53.1 42 499,278
Canada Vancouver 100 29 346,995
Australia Fremantle 100 13.2 213,908
Brisbane 100 24 352,553
Sydney 90 38.6 627,124
Melbourne 100 34 723,708
Mozambique Maputo 67 8 44,349
France Le Havre 36.67 48.3 354,478
Marseille 20.40 27.7 314,911
Fos 20.40 19.5 352,000
Belgium Antwerp 100 (Derwaide, 6th Harbour & Hanse) 86 (Churchill not incl.) 1,631,929
Antwerp-Gateway (bulk) 42.5 78 N.A.
England Tilbury 34 32 126,449
Southampton 51 76.5 1,441,011
Source: Website P&O ports
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of port actors. As such, this paper makes a theoretical
contribution to recent research and literature on the
interface of economic and transportation geography.
The port of Dubai was introduced to enhance our
empirical and conceptual understanding of the evo-
lution of global production networks and the strate-
gies for territorially embedded organizations to
upgrade their role in these GPNs. Dubai is an
important case in that its twin ports have developed
into the region’s major logistics and transhipment hub
and, secondly, it represents a successful transforma-
tion of a local port authority into a global terminal
operator under rather unique geopolitical, economic,
institutional circumstances.
Through the construction of the most modern port
facilities in the region, in combination with a
sophisticated package of investment incentives for
foreign businesses, Dubai managed to take full
advantage of its strategic location as regards the
burgeoning container traffic between east and west. It
lured many leading manufacturers and suppliers to
the port’s Free Zone and, as such, has become firmly
inserted within their global supply chains. With DPA
in full control over the ports’ land, infra-and super-
structure and with its capability to mobilize resources
through its position within the PCFC/Dubai World
conglomerate, it can engage in strategic pricing
through considerable discounts on the terminal tariffs
and the custom duties that, in combination with
efficient procedures and operations, allow the ship-
ping lines and their clients to capture value. Most
significant, however, is the Emirate’s governance
structure. The state itself resembles a multi-national
corporation: it is run by an appointed, not democrat-
ically chosen, executive council; it is hardly sup-
ported by taxes, and hence is not accountable to a
polity; it has strategically integrated its operations,
management and responsibilities both vertically and
horizontally to create both functional-economic and
spatial synergy; it has a compliant, multi-national
workforce; and it has spread its commercial wings
across the globe. The PCFC can be regarded as the
key government department or state-owned enterprise
of Dubai in the Emirate’s quest to become the
‘Singapore of the Middle East’.
At the same time, the SOP of Dubai also restricts
shipping lines in their pursuit of dedicated terminals
and it constrains the local market entry of terminal
operators to the benefit of DPA (cf. the downward
arrows of Fig. 1). Beginning in the 1990s, these
players started setting up competitive facilities across
the region, and mostly in more favourable locations
with respect to the major east–west ocean routes. The
development of efficient mega-terminals in India and
along the Arabian Sea especially, posed considerable
threats to Dubai’s position as transhipment hub. This
incited Dubai to pursue an aggressive supply chain
strategy, aimed at dominance in the regional port
network; first by acquiring management contracts and
operating rights across the region, later on through
the corporate takeovers of CSX World Terminals and
P&O Ports. Especially the P&O Ports-deal and the
Jeddah operations provided DPW with a leading (if
not dominant) position in the region, controlling at
least 40–45% of its container traffic.
Looking to the future, an interesting aspect is that
through its corporate takeovers, PCFC acquired
operating rights in ports across the globe in which
it has to operate under different conditions. As such it
has become territorially embedded within other port
SOPs through which it can capture value. The
question arises whether this will affect the established
commitments made to Dubai Ports and whether
future investments will be targeted at the growth
markets of India and China instead. In that respect it
will be interesting to watch whether DPA will
dedicate one of the planned new terminals at Jebel
Ali to one of the major shipping lines. In line with
this scenario is the question as to what degree DPA as
the port authority can remain involved in container-
handling, or whether DPW will split off from PCFC
as a separate commercial entity just as happened in
the case of the former Port Authority of Singapore:
PSA.
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